Syria, Deterrence of Chemical Weapons and U.S. Policy in the Middle East – By Joshua Landis

Syria, Deterrence of Chemical Weapons and U.S. Policy in the Middle East
By Joshua Landis
For Syria Comment – April 12, 2018

President Trump has been provoked into action by the terrible videos coming out of Syria. They are horrifying. He can uphold the Obama policy, which is to stand by the international norm of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons if it is proven that Assad used chemical weapons. It is the policy that he has already adopted following the use of Sarin at Khan Shaikhun. The mistake of both Obama and Trump has been to allowed the use of chlorine gas to slip under the radar. It was not originally proscribed in the 2013 deal, and though added to list later, it has not been acted upon. Trump can probably deter further use of chlorine gas in Syria by hurting the regime with a missile strike. But such a strike will be a narrow response, unlikely to change the course of the war. Some 1,900 Syrians have been killed so far by chemical weapons. Further missile strikes will not address the deaths of close to half a million Syrians.

Opposition members, Sunni states, and Israel will again be disappointed and critical of Washington when a narrow exercise of deterrence doesn’t alter the balance of power in Syria or signal the beginning of a US war against the Assad regime.

Trump’s instinct to keep the US from establishing a permanent role in Syria is fundamentally correct, in my estimation. 

The US would be committing a grave mistake should it try to build a viable state in North Syria for the Kurds. Northeast Syria is a poor part of country that is beset by many problems. Kurds and Arabs have diametrically opposed national ambitions in the region. The tribes are at each other’s throats after years of war and being forced to join one rebel force after another. Blood feuds abound. Social services and the foundations for a state are practically non-existent in the region. Kurds number about 2 to 2.5 million in population. For US policy makers to be arguing that Northeast Syria is the right place for America to build a viable policy in the region that can roll back Iran, bring about regime-change in Damascus, and reestablish American credibility in the Northern Middle East is frankly incredible. Those who espouse such a policy probably know little about the social and political realities of the region and do not appreciate the commitment and great expense that such an effort would entail, not to mention that it is likely doomed to failure. It will be even more difficult than building a viable central state in northern Iraq that would include Kirkuk, etc.

But the US does not have to abandon the Kurds of Syria to the predations of Turkey or the Assad regime.

The US should be helping the Kurdish leadership of North Syria negotiate a deal with Assad that promotes both their interests: Kurdish autonomy and Syrian sovereignty. Both have shared interests, which make a deal possible. Both see Turkey as their main danger. Both need to cooperate in order to exploit the riches of the region. Both distrust radical Islamists and fear their return. Neither can rebuild alone. Syria’s Kurdish regions need to sell their produce to Syria and to establish transit rights; Damascus needs water, electricity and oil. Of course, policing any deal between the PYD and Damascus will not be easy. Northern Syrians will look to Washington to help guarantee their liberties. But helping both sides to strike a deal sooner than later is important. Washington has the leverage in Syria to make such an agreement last and to help the Kurds; it does not have the leverage to depose Assad or roll back Iran. Today, demands are not entrenched, institutions and parties are not established, and borders are not fixed. Tomorrow, they will be. The US can help the Kurds get a better deal on resource sharing than they have had in the past.

To build an independent or quasi independent state in North Syria that has its own army and that can defend itself in the face of Turkish, Iranian, Russian, and Syrian efforts to destroy it will require a commitment of decades, not years. It will need billions upon billions of dollars and a real nation-building effort, not simply a stabilization program.

If the US wants to get out of Syria in the next few years, it cannot tell Kurds that it will remain in the region for the long-haul to promote a viable statelet in North Syria and make it an instrument of an ambitious U.S. policy to hurt all of its neighbors.

The US has failed in its effort to produce a US-friendly and democratic Northern Middle East, where Sunnis and Shiites power-share and emulate US forms of governance. Turkey has turned to Russia and authoritarianism. Iraq is a Shiite-dominated state that needs decades to build reliable institutions that will allow it to turn away from dependence on Iran. Assad’s authority has survived in most of Syria, and Hizbullah is more powerful than ever in Lebanon. For the US to believe that it can reverse this history of political failure and misspent millions by launching a comeback in North Syria is nothing short of laughable.

To promote US policies of counter-terrorism, refugee return, and stabilization, not to mention economic revival for future generations, Washington should admit its losses and stop further efforts to defeat Iran or Russia in the region. It should allow these powers to rebuild the region. The US does not have to cooperate with Assad in rebuilding or spend its own money on the effort, but it should allow the region to stabilize and revive on its own, finding help where it can. Blocking highways, withholding oil resources to punish Assad, and building up yet more militias will not further long-term US objectives. It may gratify our allies, who want the United States to roll back Iran. It may also satisfy those who want to turn the region into a quagmire for both Russia and the Iranians, but it is neither wise nor humanitarian.

The US has the dominant position in the southern Middle East – the Gulf, Egypt and North Africa – where oil wealth is plentiful. It can do without the northern Middle East and should recognize the new security architecture of the region, where Iran has influence in the North. The US can help Israel and Saudi Arabia deter and contain Iran without a launchpad for power-projection in north Syria.

Only by returning to the simple truth that prosperity will advance U.S. interests will the US begin to put an end to terrorism, promote democracy, and attenuate the flood of refugees that pours from the region. Democracy, moderation, and the acceptance of liberal values will only come with education and economic growth. There is no quick fix to the region’s problems. Ensuring that Syrians and Iranians remain poor in the hope that they will demand regime-change is a bad policy. It has not worked despite decades of sanctions. Instead, sanctions have brought collapse, war, and bitterness to the region. Dividing Syrians and keeping them poor may ensure short-term US interests, but in the long-term it will ensure failure and more wars. Only by promoting growth and unity can the United States advance stability, the rule of law, and liberal values.

Addendum II: The fact that Chlorine is not listed as a Chemical Weapon in the Chemical Weapons Convention does not constitute a “loophole” in the 2013 agreement. “The of any toxic chemical as a weapon of war is banned under the CWC,” wrotes Amy Gordon, who helped negotiate the CWC for the U.S. and led the substantive input to the Senate for its ratification. Here is her nice note of correction:

Dear Josh,

I follow your site faithfully and think it makes a huge contribution to our knowledge and understanding of the complex issues unfolding in Syria.

One small correction, however.  Regarding chlorine. The fact that it is not listed in the schedules of the CWC does not mean that it constitutes a loophole in the 2013 agreement. The use of any toxic chemical as a weapon of war is banned under the CWC. The lists are simply meant to capture a range of the most toxic chemicals descending from those which have no commercial use to those which have some or mostly commercial applications. Nothing further needed to be done to establish the illegality of the use of chlorine as a weapon of war.

You probably don’t have time to read the link, but here’s the OPCW’s authoritative description of chemical weapons.  https://www.opcw.org/about-chemical-weapons/what-is-a-chemical-weapon/

The real question regarding chlorine use, therefore appears to be political, not legal. Unfortunately, I can’t say why the CWC parties have been relatively sanguine about chlorine use and exercised about nerve agent, except to say that the effects of nerve agent are more severe and dramatic, creating a public reaction that makes official indifference more difficult.  No doubt events on the ground in Syria are contributing as well.

Best, Amy

Research Professor: Institute for Security and Conflict Studies
Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University
gordonae7@gmail.com

Addendum: A friend asked: “Can you tell us what we do if ISIS reconstitutes itself to a degree in Syria?”